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Abstract
Innovation and Technology policies provide positive incentives to the firms to perform R&D activities. This article examines 
the decision of internal and external R&D expenditures of subsidized firms, estimating the impact of R&D subsidies on 
firms performing different innovation strategies. The Spanish survey on business strategy for manufacturing firms (ESEE) 
is used for the period 1998-2005. Results show that determinants of pure internal or external R&D expenditures obey 
to different motivations, affecting in consequence, the impact of the subsidies on firms adopting different sources of 
knowledge.
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bardella, 1990; Granstrand and Pavitt, 1997; Narula, 2001; 
Pisano, 1990; Teece, 1986) has not received attention from 
an evaluation point of view even when its application could 
contribute to improve innovation policy design.
Decision between internal and external R&D has been re-
ceiving growing attention (Beneito, 2003; Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Love and Roper, 2002; Vega-Jurado, Gutiér-
rez-Gracia and Fernández-de-Lucio, 2009; Watkins and Paff, 
2009).  These papers found that pure or mixed, internal and 
external R&D strategies obey different motivations and 
could generate differences in firm’s performance.  Never-
theless, to our knowledge, there are no works incorporating 
this distinction in order to evaluate the connection between 
public subsidies and innovation business strategy. Do public 
subsidies affect firms performing different innovation strate-
gies in a different way? Do innovation strategies influence 
the reception of R&D subsidies?  These, and related ques-
tions, are the main motivation of this work.
Internal-external decision is not casual, but a response of 
firm’s perception about technological opportunities, benefits 
from innovation, financial restrictions and market conditions. 
Therefore, innovation strategy is conditioned by some spe-
cific variables. 
The main hypothesis discussed in this work is that variables 
influencing on public decision agency are linked to those set 
of variables affecting the election of a determinate innova-
tion strategy. Studies analyzing R&D subsidies’ concession 
process show that technological contribution, technical ca-
pabilities, level of internationalization, expected social impact 
and knowledge spillovers are key factors in public agency de-
cision (Duch, García-Quevedo and Montolio, 2011; Huergo 
and Trenado, 2010). All these variables seem to be related 
in certain extent with the determinants of make or buy de-
cision. Those contributions shed light about some aspects 
of technology policy relatively unknown as consequence of 
unavailability of data. I propose to connect this new informa-
tion about public agency decisions, with decisions in innova-
tion strategy, and explore the interaction among the types of 
R&D activities performed by the firm, and the assessing and 
concession of R&D subsidies. 
Literature Review
Internal and external R&D decisions have been analyzed in 
numerous works. In general, R&D make-or-buy decision has 
been discussed following three majors motivations. The first 
of them is focused on the determinants influencing inter-
nal and external R&D decisions (Audretsch, Menkveld and 
Thurik, 1996; Beneito, 2003; Girma et al., 2010; Granstrand 
and Pavitt, 1997; Howells, James and Malik, 2003; Love and 
Roper, 2002; Mowery, 1983; Narula, 2001; Piga and Vivarelli, 
Introduction
R&D subsidies are central part of innovation and technology 
policy in industrialized economies. According to expansion 
of innovation policy, direct and indirect analysis for assess-
ing impacts and outcomes of policy measures have gained 
importance. It is reflected in a growing stream of literature, 
focused on innovation policy in general and R&D subsidies 
in particular (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Blanes and Bu-
som, 2004; Busom, 2000; Czarnitzki, 2006; Czarnitzki and 
Licht, 2006; Duguet, 2004; García-Quevedo and Afcha, 2009; 
González and Pazó, 2008; Herrera and Heijs, 2007; Lach, 
2002). 
Despite the growing attention devoted to this issue, some 
aspects about the effectiveness of innovation policy remain 
unclear. In a recent work, Jaffe (2008) remarks upon the 
need to advance in the understanding of how governments 
interact with the system they are trying to affect; similar 
calls have been made in other pieces of work (David, Hall 
and Toole, 2000; Shapira and Kuhlmann, 2003). In response 
to this claim, some recent studies explore new connections 
between, and mechanism of, the public policy and programs 
and their impact, studying not only their direct input or out-
put additionality, but also going a step further in the relation-
ship between subsidies and firm’s performance. (Autio, Kan-
ninen and Gustafsson, 2008; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 
2008; Clarysse, Wright and Mustar, 2009). 
Traditionally, financial additionality, commonly interpreted as 
the increase of firm’s R&D expenditures caused by public 
funds, has been the main criteria used in evaluation studies. 
In the most of cases, this evaluation studies discard total 
crowding out effects of public funds at firm or project level 
and even find that funded firms would not have been un-
dertaken R&D projects without the public support (Berg-
man et al., 2010) Behavioral additionality argues that R&D 
programs impact not only at the level of project but also at 
organizational level. Norrman and Klofsten (2010) report 
long term effects in Swedish firms funded by the VINN NU 
grants. They found an improvement in firms’ knowledge of 
the market and their relations with external investors, Malik 
and Cunningham (2006) also confirm the relevance of previ-
ous experiences in funded R&D programs and its positive 
effect in subsequent projects. 
This organizational changes due to public funds, comes pre-
ceded by decisions related with the pool of knowledge used 
by the firm, and in consequence, by financial decisions about 
R&D expenditure allocation. Therefore, this work explores 
R&D decisions as response to public subsidies concession. 
R&D expenditure presents a heterogeneous composition 
that, despite being broadly recognized (Arora and Gam-
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sectors, the learning effect produced by performing internal 
activities has a decisive role in assimilation of informational 
flows from external sources.
Absorptive capacity hypothesis rises as a relevant factor in 
most of the works explaining mixed innovation strategy. Of-
ten, R&D intensity at internal level appears as a relevant vari-
able, positively influencing the adoption of external sources 
in general, and in the form of cooperation agreements, in 
particular.  
This influence seems to be related with the type of part-
ners (Vega-Jurado et al., 2009; Belderbos et al., 2004; Fritsch 
and Lukas, 2001) as well as the type of external relationship 
(outsourcing or cooperation agreement) and the number 
of third-party agreements established. Dhont-Peltrault and 
Pfister (2011) found that R&D intensive firms are more dis-
posed to outsourcing as a means to reduce transactional 
cost and this type of external relationship is more frequent 
in standardized or generic technology.    
In the same direction, other works show that adoption 
of mixed innovation strategies generates positive effects 
in firms’ performance as a result of complementarities of 
the two types of R&D. In fact, interaction between inter-
nal R&D activities and cooperation agreements has been 
investigated, confirming a positive effect on firms’ innovative 
performance (Becker and Dietz, 2004; Schmiedeberg, 2008; 
Veugelers, 1997).
 
Other motivations for external R&D are explained by cost 
reduction in process innovation. Love and Roper (2002) 
explain internal and external decision through internal in-
novation cost.  Implicitly, their work assumes that, above a 
certain level of cost, firms will prefer external R&D. They 
identify key elements affecting internal cost of innovation 
as: scale economies in innovation production function, size 
of the firms, capacity or plant level and standardization of 
production process.
Regarding the size of the firm, it is not only related to in-
creasing returns to scale, but also to appropriability regimes 
in product markets. Atahuene-Gima (1992) and Love and 
Roper (2002) emphasize the importance of appropriability 
conditions as key determinants of internal R&D. They argue 
that more the market power and market concentration the 
firms have, the more reluctant to contract external knowl-
edge acquisition in R&D projects or pay for licensing the 
firm will be. It is a consequence of the risk related with 
imitations or limited appropriability caused by incomplete 
property rights on innovation products. Nevertheless, some 
works present difference in relation to this point. Beneito 
(2003) expose in the opposite direction that, as strong 
source of competitive advantage, R&D internal capabilities 
are related to a higher level of competition. 
2004; Pisano, 1990; Teece, 1980; Veugelers and Cassiman, 
1999; Williams and Lee, 2009). Second motivation examines 
if make-or-buy decision is relevant in terms of firm’s perfor-
mance; this view is concerned to explore the relationship 
between firms’ innovation or economic results and the use 
of internal or external source of knowledge (Bönte, 2003; 
Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2009; Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace, 
2002; Montoya, Zárate and Martín, 2007; Vega-Jurado et al., 
2009; Vega-Jurado et al., 2008). Lastly, third point of interest 
analyzes complementarities between internal and external 
R&D activities; that is, if the productivity of the firm increas-
es carrying out simultaneously both types of activities or, 
on the contrary, are substitutes (Arora and Gambardella, 
1990, 1994; Becker and Dietz, 2004; Caloghirou, Kastelli and 
Tsakanikas, 2004; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; Schmiedeberg, 2008; Watkins and Paff, 2009)
 From this evidence, one can deduce the convenience of 
analyzing R&D expenditure as a concept of heterogeneous 
composition, which, both at the decision level and for its 
implications in firms’ performance, could raise differences 
associated with the R&D combinations.  Consequently, inno-
vation strategy examined through the combination of inter-
nal and external R&D activities should be included in order 
to consider these heterogeneities.  
The literature points out many arguments in order to ex-
plain why the firms could be interested in engaging in ex-
ternal or internal R&D activities. From a theoretical point 
of view, cost transactional theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1989) suggests that externalization of activities takes place 
only when the transactional costs associated to these activi-
ties are lower than those associated with internal activities. 
This condition implies that external knowledge acquisition 
requires a complementary base of resources and a high level 
of specificity between cooperative firms and their partners, 
in order to allow for knowledge transfer. Based on this the-
ory, Audretsch et al. (1996) examine internal and external in-
vestment decision in the manufacturing sector. Their results 
show that firms with higher levels of specificity with their 
partners and a high base of internal knowledge for assimila-
tion and absorption are more prone to use external sourc-
es. In addition, their conclusions observe the importance of 
technological opportunities in the acquisition of external 
knowledge.  They also found that both types of R&D are 
complementary in firms from high technology sectors and 
substitutes in low intensity technology sectors.
Arora and Gambardella’s (1990; 1994) conclusions for the 
biotechnology sector coincide with those of Audretsch et al. 
(1996)  and other empirical works (Watkins and Paff, 2009) 
in pointing out that complementarities between internal and 
external R&D take place specially in the sectors character-
ized by a complex and fast technological change. In these 
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ternal acquisition of technology raise as alternative to those 
firms financially constrained.  The issue we try to explore is 
how the technology strategy changes when R&D subsidies 
gradually solves this barrier, and more important, what hap-
pens when public financed project ends.  
Tsai and Wang (2007) and Jones (2001) found that firms per-
forming internal R&D have a better performance that firms 
performing external R&D. If public intervention mitigates 
the financials restrictions, one could suppose that subsidized 
firms will be more prone to carry out internal R&D. 
In respect to the continuity of innovative activities, empiri-
cal evidence show that in some cases, once a firm receive a 
subsidy and develop a public financed innovative project, it 
acts as signal in the financial markets and eases the access 
to finance subsequent R&D projects.  Past experience on 
public subsidy application, also allow to the firm knowledge 
accumulation and expertise to exploit new products and 
process and capacity to generate new R&D projects. Based 
on these arguments the idea that R&D subsidies conduct to 
higher internal R&D is supported. 
Finally, is necessary to consider the appropriablity mecha-
nism behind internal and external R&D. Appropriability con-
ditions, conceived as the set of rights allowing capturing and 
claiming the returns of innovation activities, are strongly 
related with the type of activity performed.  Firms contract-
ing external R&D are not always in the position to enforce 
contractual clauses or control property rights on the con-
tracted activities. 
Atuahene-Gima (1992) and Love and Roper (2002) empha-
size the importance of this appropriability conditions as key 
determinants of internal R&D, arguing that the more market 
power and market concentration the firms have, the more 
reluctant  to contract external knowledge acquisition in 
R&D projects or pay for licensing, the firm will be. It is a 
consequence of the risk related with imitations or limited 
appropriability caused by incomplete property rights on in-
novations products.
Therefore, in a competitive market scheme, external ac-
quisition could suppose the reduction of market share or 
the loss of exclusivity on the sales of new products in the 
market. In consequence, the mix of R&D activities proposed 
by the firm to be financed, is also linked to those variables 
influencing on the appropriability regimes like size, market 
conditions of cooperative behavior.
Public agency, on the other hand, gives priority to projects 
with pre-established characteristics.  According to Huergo 
and Trenado (2010, p.248) three major goals pursued by the 
national public agency (CDTI) in Spain: 
Lastly, there are elements related with financial market im-
perfections and the risk associated with R&D investment, 
which could suppose important restrictions in the make-or-
buy decision. Incursion on internal activities imposes strong 
sunk costs to the firms. These costs are, to a great extent, ir-
reversible and in some cases (i.e. labor costs) also recurrent 
(Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Hall, 2002; Narula, 2001; Watkins and 
Paff, 2009).
Alternatively, external acquisition supposes a lower eco-
nomic effort and it is a priori secure than internal activi-
ties (contracting firm acquires developed innovations or as-
sumes a shared risk on the development of a project with 
one or more partners), but it    involves another kind of risk 
whose nature is associated to the threat of the competence. 
Firms contracting external R&D are not always in the po-
sition to enforce contractual clauses or control property 
rights on the contracted activities. 
Therefore, in a competitive market scheme, external acqui-
sition could suppose the reduction of market share or the 
loss of exclusivity on the sales of new products in the mar-
ket.
Innovation Strategy and R&D Subsidies
In order to analyze the impact of R&D subsidies on firms 
three elements are considered, the temporality dimension, 
the appropriability mechanisms and the financial problems. 
The temporality dimension is defined by the state-depend-
ence nature of innovative activities. Most papers evaluating 
the effect of R&D subsidies, underscore the importance to 
consider sensitivity of firms’ decisions to the reception of 
subsidies and innovative performance in the past (González 
and Pazó, 2008; Huergo and Trenado, 2010). The choice be-
tween internal and external R&D, is especially affected by this 
fact. Internal activities have a strong component of recurrent 
expenditures, and it is reasonably suppose that core innova-
tive activities are performed by the firm with independence 
of the reception of public funds. In contrast, external R&D 
could be considered as complementary or eventual deci-
sion, influenced by financial factors and discontinuous tech-
nological changes cycle life stage.  In other words, in absence 
of any clauses restricting the allocation of public funds, one 
can expect that R&D subsidies stimulate increasing internal 
R&D in those firms with low rates of R&D effort, or in the 
case of firms previously performing internal R&D activities, 
an increase of external R&D.
From a financial point of view, R&D subsidies applications 
are influenced by the difficulty to access private financial 
markets (Huergo and Trenado, 2010). Moreover, External 
R&D exhibit lower costs than internal R&D (Love and Rop-
er, 2002). Taking into account these two premises jointly, ex-
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Methodology
One of the main problems in R&D subsidy application pro-
cess is the existence of selection and endogeneity problems. 
Status participation is determined by both the firms’ applica-
tion and public agency concession of the subsidy.  Since data 
about firms applying for a subsidy process is not available, it 
is possible to observe only those firms that are applying and 
obtaining a subsidy. It can be written as: 
(1)
 
Where, Si is a censored variable indicating the reception of 
subsidy, and it is only observable for those firms that applied 
and obtained a subsidy (S=1); otherwise, firms’ performance 
remains unobservable (S=0); xi is a set of explanatory vari-
ables influencing the probability to obtain R&D public sub-
sidies and, ui is an error term following bivariate normal 
distribution.
Furthermore, potential endogeneity bias needs to be con-
sidered, because R&D subsidies are not randomly conceded 
and both, the decision of public agency and firms’ R&D ex-
penditures, could be determined by unobservable factors 
(Busom, 2000; Lichtenberg, 1984).  The problems originated 
by this situation have been tackled through selection models 
(Busom, 2000; Wallsten, 2000) and matching techniques of 
estimation (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Blanes and Busom, 
2004; Czarnitzki, 2006; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Duguet, 
2004; González and Pazó, 2008; Herrera and Heijs, 2007; 
Lach, 2002).
 
This work estimates a two step treatment effects model, 
where R&D subsidies are defined as the treatment.  So, it 
is possible to observe firms exposed to the treatment and 
firms that have not been exposed to the treatment. In a first 
stage, a probit model is estimated, in order to analyze the 
process of R&D subsidies. At this stage, determinants to ap-
ply and obtain a R&D subsidy are identified. 
Second stage regresses a continuous outcome variable (log-
arithm of R&D expenditures) on a set of explanatory vari-
ables, wi.
(2)
Where, GIDi=GID*i if Si=1;  wi is a set of explanatory vari-
ables influencing the level of R&D expenditure.
The Selection Equation
First stage of treatment selection model is estimated through 
probit regression. Selection equation has, as dependent vari-
able, the participation status in subsidy concession, taking 
the value 1 for subsidized firms and 0 for unsubsidized.
“funding R&D projects that would not be otherwise car-
ried out; second, to encourage the technological upgrading 
of firms that are of particular importance in declining or 
traditional industries; and third, to foster national champions, 
independent of the gap between social and private benefits. 
Other objectives can include the development of projects 
with a high capacity for  diffusion and a profound economic 
impact, or giving priority to projects that generate behav-
ioral additionality by stimulating, for example, cooperation 
among firms.”
Similar objectives are present in the analysis of public agency 
decision carried out by Duch et al. (2011) for the region of 
Catalonia, in Spain.  
A priori, firms with mixed strategies could increase its likeli-
hood to satisfy some of these points of evaluation. Firms 
performing only internal R&D, could develop projects with 
high levels of innovation, but its probabilities to engage with 
external partners are lower in absence of external R&D 
expenditures. Similarly, firms developing only external R&D 
could need internal capabilities in order to take advantage 
from external sources of knowledge and achieve higher level 
of innovation or increase its R&D expenditures. Finally, firms 
with combined strategy tend to apply with projects charac-
terized by higher internal commitment with R&D activities 
and are more likely to engage with external partners. 
Data Description and Methodology. 
The database
The data used corresponds to the Survey on Business Strat-
egy (ESEE for its Spanish acronym) for the period 1998-
2005. This survey offers a rich panel data on different dimen-
sions of firms’ strategy. This allows controlling for different 
aspects of the business strategy, deepening both at the deci-
sion process, and in the changes induced by these decisions. 
The sample includes firms from manufacturing sector with 
positive R&D expenditure during at least one year in the 
period 1998-2005.
The ESEE is not exclusively centered on innovation. So there 
is information related with diverse areas in business strategy. 
It is a great advantage because, as commented previously, 
internal and external decision of R&D is not only affected 
by technological factors but also by organizational, human, fi-
nancial and other strategic areas in the firm. The complexity 
of this interaction is the main reason to use this information 
in order to capture its influences on innovation strategy.
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The Outcome Equation
Variables in outcome equation represent the set of explana-
tory variables, wi, specified in equation 2, and influencing the 
level of R&D expenditure conditioned by the firms’ strategy:
Technological Cooperation: One of the motives to engage in 
R&D cooperation with firms or public research institutions 
Determinant of R&D subsidies has been analyzed in numer-
ous opportunities. The main variables used in empirical lit-
erature have been selected (Blanes and Busom, 2004; Bu-
som, 2000; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; García-Quevedo and 
Afcha, 2009; González and Pazó, 2008; Herrera and Heijs, 
2007; Huergo and Trenado, 2010). This set of explanatory 
variables represents vector xi in equation 1. Table 1 shows 




Cooperation with universities and 
technological centers.
+ Dummy=1 if firms cooperate with universities or tech. centers during 
the previous year, otherwise  0. 
Horizontal cooperation + Dummy=1 if firms cooperate with competitors or is engaged in strate-
gic alliances, otherwise  0. 
Vertical cooperation + Dummy=1 if firms cooperate with customers or suppliers, otherwise 0. 
Medium-high technology industry + Firms form medium-high industrial technology sectors.
Recruitment of engineers and gradu-
ates of  recent graduation
+ Dummy=1 if firms recruit engineers and graduates, otherwise, 0.
R&D effort in previous year + Total R&D expenditure divided between total sales. 
Age +/- Number of years. 
Employees +/- Total number of employees.
% of Foreign capital - % of foreign capital.
Exports + Exports in euros
Table 1. Independent variables in subsidy concession process
is to share the cost associated with the development of in-
novation products. Although there is not enough empirical 
evidence about the connection between the level of R&D 
expenditures and technological cooperation, it is reason-
able to expect that total R&D expenditures increase with 
technological cooperation. In order to capture the influence 
of this variable, several variables are proposed: cooperation 
with university or technological centers, vertical coopera-
tion and horizontal cooperation. 
Fölster (1995) notes that R&D cooperation effects are di-
rectly related with clauses on result-sharing agreements. As 
a consequence, firms including these clauses in their con-
tracts increase the likelihood of cooperation but reduce 
R&D investments. On the other hand, the absence of re-
sults-sharing agreements does not increase the probability 
of cooperation but increase incentives to conduct R&D. Re-
cent papers describe profit sharing associated to different 
forms of collaboration and how this profit depends heavily 
on the technology input of  each partner (Stein and Gine-
vicius, 2010). Unfortunately, information about cooperation 
agreements is not available in ESEE database.
Medium-High technological industry intensity: Empirical lit-
erature shows that internal and external performances in 
high technology industries are conceived as complementary 
sources rather than substitutes, and often they combine 
both internal and external R&D (Arora and Gambardella, 
1994; Audretsch, 1996; Watkins and Paff, 2009). Following 
this relationship, most of the studies show that innovative 
industrial sectors are associated with higher level of R&D 
expenditures in general. 
Recruitment of recent graduates and engineers: External 
knowledge assimilation requires qualified human resources 
with capabilities to adapt external knowledge and to fulfill 
internal requirements of the firm. Recruited qualified per-
sonnel reinforce internal capabilities in order to develop 
R&D activities and exchange and incorporate information 
from external firms or institutions in the future (Audretsch 
et al., 1996; Beneito, 2003; González and Pazó, 2008; Mowery, 
1983) 
Number of workers: Shumpeterian notion about firm’s size 
exposes that large firms are more prone to assume success-
fully innovative activities. This hypothesis has been success-
fully tested in numerous works. Beneito (2003); Love and 
Roper (2002) and Piga and Vivarelli (2004); confirm that firm 
size has a statistically positive and significant effect on the 
likelihood to perform internal or external activities. These 
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larger than exports, it could be considered an evidence of 
technological dependence on foreign firms.  Only then we 
can expect a negative influence on internal R&D expendi-
ture.
Finally, the dummy variable that indicates exposition to the 
subsidy is used as dependent variable in the selection equa-
tion (1). As dependent variables in equation (2), we use to-
tal R&D expenditures of firms whose innovation strategy is 
to perform only internal R&D’s activities, only external and 
both internal and external activities. 
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics (table 2) show the variables included 
in both selection and outcome equation ordered by innova-
tion strategy.  Differences principally arise among firms with 
mixed strategies and pure innovation (external or internal) 
strategies.  In general, firms performing simultaneously in-
ternal and external R&D show favorable characteristics in 
order to adopt innovative activities and obtain a better in-
novative performance. These firms have a positive techno-
logical balance, a bigger effort in private R&D, recruiting a 
bigger number of personnel with experience in R&D, are 
more collaborative with public research organizations and 
have been awarded with more R&D subsidies. 
Besides, these firms have more presence in high and medi-
um-high industrial sectors and its average age is higher than 
other groups, a fact that could be interpreted as firms opting 
for this strategy have more experience in its market.
A fact to be noted in the group of pure-external innovation 
strategy is its higher average of competitors; the negative 
technological balance, indicating clearly that firms choos-
ing only external R&D are net receptors of technology and, 
higher proportion of no-diversified firms. Regarding the 
group of pure-internal innovation strategy, in general, it lies 
in an intermediate point between mixed strategy firms and 
pure external strategy, although with a position closer to 
the last group.
These differences are also reflected in the distribution of 
public subsidies; 37.8% of firms performing simultaneous 
internal and external R&D, compared with 13% and 8% of 
pure internal and external strategy, respectively. 
Results  
Table 4 reports the results of the two-step treatment ef-
fects model. Three different regressions were estimated us-
ing logarithm of R&D expenditures as dependent variable, 
conditioned on innovation strategy: only internal, only ex-
ternal and internal and external R&D. Lambda is statistically 
effects could have an inverted U shape on the cost of inno-
vation, reflecting scale economies in R&D activities.
Own funds: Empirical literature coincides, identifying finan-
cial cost as main obstacle to develop R&D activities (Hall, 
2002; Segarra-Blasco, García-Quevedo and Teruel-Carrizosa, 
2008; Jang and Chang, 2008; Toole and Turvey, 2009; Ughetto, 
2008; Watkins and Paff, 2009). This barrier diminishes in the 
case of external R&D activities as its cost is, in general, low-
er than internal R&D cost (Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Beneito, 
2003; Love and Roper, 2002). Expected sign for this variable 
is, thus, positive for internal activities and negative in the 
case of external R&D activities. 
No diversification: Innovation development implies the se-
lection of a technological trajectory and the investment of 
specifics assets in order to develop distinctive and niche ca-
pabilities (Narula, 2001). In fact, it has important implications 
on specialization of the production process. As long as the 
firm’s production process is more specific or specialized, it 
will be costly to carry out external R&D. In contrast, a di-
versified production facilitates the incorporation of generic 
external knowledge.  Empirical results obtained by Beneito 
(2003) and Love and Ropper (2002) confirm this hypothesis 
and show that diversification  is inversely related to internal 
R&D adoption and directly associated with external R&D. 
Number of competitors: Evidence with respect to this vari-
able is ambiguous. On one hand, the use of external R&D in 
concentrated markets could suppose a high risk on the ap-
propriability of innovation results; thus, internal R&D would 
be preferred as acquisition source in presence of few com-
petitors (Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Love and Roper, 2002). On 
the other hand, market structures characterized by intense 
competition could be conceived as source of competitive 
advantages (Baumol, 2002; Beneito, 2003). This fact could 
originate the opposite result: the higher the number of com-
petitors, the lower the internal R&D expenditures.
Private effort in previous year: It is a proxy for the intensity 
of activities related with innovations. It is calculated as the 
ratio of total R&D expenditures divided between total sales 
of the firms in the previous year – the more the effort car-
ried out by the firm respect to the sales the previous year, 
the bigger the likelihood of the firm to perform R&D activi-
ties at external or internal level. 
Technological balance: This variable is calculated as the dif-
ference between incomes and payments for licenses and 
technical assistance from abroad. Positive values of these 
variables would indicate independence and technological 
strength as well as complete property rights on obtained 
innovations. This situation would be associated with carrying 
out internal R&D.  In contrast, if technological imports are 
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Innovation Strategy
Only internal R&D Only external R&D Internal and external R&D
Rate of technological cooperation 
with Univ.or  tech centers 
34% 32% 66%
Rate of technological cooperation 
with competitors 
10% 8% 21%
Rate of technological cooperation 
with suppliers or clients
65% 51% 76%
Percentage of firms belonging to High 
– medium-high technology sectors
41% 32% 51%
Percentage of firms declaring recruit-
ment of recent graduates and Engi-
neers.
24% 22% 36%
Effort in previous year (R&D expen-
ditures / sales)
1.33 0.89 2.42




Nº employees 379.11 350.53 582
Own funds(own funds/ liabilities) 43.11% 44.93% 46.12%
Percentage of firms declaring no di-
versification of products 
84% 87% 83%
Number of competitors 1.57 1.69 1.47
Age 31.42 28.53 35.87
Total  exports in euros. 4.2 e07 4.23 e07 4.61 e07
Percentage of  foreign capital 33.45% 30.72% 31.97%
Table 2. Descriptives statistics
Table 3. Conceded subsidies by R&D strategy in percentage.
Only internal R&D Only external R&D Internal and external 
R&D
Total
Mean 13.06% 8.21% 37.8% 24.61%
N 1822 694 2460 4976
significant in all the three estimations. This coefficient is a 
measure of correlation between the error terms ui and ei 
from equations 1 and 2.  Therefore, it confirms that econo-
metric strategy is adequate in order to control the endog-
eneity problem. 
Results from the first step of the estimation show the de-
terminants of the subsidy concession. These coincide with 
the previous work and the sign of the variables as expected 
in table 1. With the exception of the percentage of foreign 
capital and age for firms performing internal and external 
activities, the rest of variables have a positive influence on 
the likelihood to obtain a R&D subsidy.  
Significant variables at this stage are consistent with a priori 
expected results about public agency decision. Technologi-
cal cooperation is relevant for firms with independence of 
their strategy. However, considerations about the type of 
cooperation are interesting. For firms investing in internal 
R&D activities, cooperation with universities and technology 
centers is relevant for the public agency. Empirical works 
show that this type of cooperation is frequent in order to 
develop breakthrough innovations new to the market, which 
require strong innovative capabilities developed internal-
ly (Belderbos et al., 2004; Belderbos, Carree and Lokshin, 
2006; Laursen and Salter, 2004; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; 
Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003; Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003; 
Teece, 1980, 1986; Tether, 2002).  In contrast, horizontal and 
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ogy, but are collaborating in order to develop some tech-
nological capabilities. This fact reflects the importance of 
internal capabilities as the key factor in order to assimilate 
external knowledge, adapt and exploit it, even in the absence 
of external expenditures in R&D. 
In the case of firms with only external R&D, the sign of 
cooperation with universities and technological centers is 
negative. This type of cooperation does not always imply to 
allocate a financial budget. In fact, if cooperation agreement 
consists of a professional internship program or a profes-
sional exchange, it could represent a save for the firm. Infor-
mation about cooperation agreements does not allow for a 
more precise explanation.
Firms from medium and high technology intensity sectors 
devote more resources to R&D activities – it is confirmed 
for innovative firms with independence of their innovation 
strategy. A similar picture could be observed with the re-
cruitment of graduates and engineers. In general, firms re-
cruiting qualified personnel are more disposed to allocate 
resources for R&D activities.
vertical cooperation are relevant in firms performing only 
external R&D. These forms of cooperation agreements are 
associated with cost-reduction oriented innovations, quality 
improvement and market expansion (Belderbos et al., 2006; 
Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Tether, 2002), a type of coop-
eration agreements where technology content requirement 
could be more generic. 
Recruitment of qualified personnel and R&D effort in previ-
ous years increases the likelihood to participate and receive 
a R&D subsidy in firms performing only internal R&D and 
mixed R&D activities. It is consistent with evaluation criteria 
applied by public agency in relation with the technical contri-
bution of the project and also with technical abilities needed 
to carry out the project successfully.
Results from second stage show the determinants of R&D 
by type of innovation strategy. Firms performing only inter-
nal R&D are positively influenced by external sources of 
knowledge, in particular, those resulting from engaging with 
universities or technology centers and vertical cooperation. 
A priori, those firms are not acquiring disembodied technol-
Only internal R&D Only external R&D External and internal 
R&D
Log of  R&D exp. Coef.
Std. Err.
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Coop. Univ. & Tech centers 0.598 0.14*** -0.61 0.22*** 0.09 0.13
Horizontal Coop. 0.19 0.15 0.39 0.41 0.13 0.09
Vertical Coop. 0.404 0.10*** 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.08
High-medium high technol-
ogy industry 0.478 0.09*** 1.357 0.23*** 0.591 0.07***
Recruitment of recent gradu-
ates and Engineers 0.443 0.12*** 0.888 0.25*** 0.565 0.07***
Effort in previous year 0.248 0.04*** 0.477 0.09*** 0.093 0.01***
Technological balance in pre-
vious year 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00*** 0.000 0.00***
Nº employees 0.000 0.00*** 0.001 0.00*** 0.000 0.00***
Own funds 0.009 0.00*** 0.012 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
No diversification 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.28 0.256 0.08***
Number of competitors 0.01 0.04 -0.12 0.09 -0.11 0.04***
Subnac -1.25 0.98 1.51 1.55 1.127 0.37***
Constant 3.430 0.21*** 2.641 0.46*** 4.415 0.15***
R&D subsidies
Coop. Univ. & Tech centers. 0.53 0.124*** -0.254 0.243 0.771 0.090***
Horizontal Coop. -0.233 0.189 0.687 0.379* 0.360 0.089***
Vertical Coop. 0.268 0.137** 0.80 0.262*** 0.088 0.088
High-medium high technol-
ogy industry 0.072 0.119 -0.289 0.286 0.104 0.078
Recruitment of recent gradu-
ates and Engineers. 0.256 0.127** 0.286 0.268 0.242 0.080***
Effort in previous year 0.136 0.027*** 0.085 0.090 0.078 0.013***
Age 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.002
Nº employees 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
% foreign capital 0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.003* -0.004 0.001***
Log of Exports -0.007 0.030 0.091 0.061 0.086 0.020***
Constant -1.640 0.469*** -3.164 0.932*** -2.424 0.317***
Time dummies included  
 
Lambda 0.877 0.530* -0.688 0.832 -0.499 0.228**
Number of obs 913 303 1476
Wald chi2(31) 553.93 293.13 1686.49
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4. Estimation results.
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Figure 1 show a graphical representation of expected R&D 
expenditures for subsidized and not subsidized firms. Figure 
1a, for firms with only internal R&D, shows that most of the 
non-subsidized firms are concentrated at lower levels of ex-
penditure while, if we move from the left to the right, there 
is a major proportion of subsidized firms with higher levels 
of R&D expenditure. This show that firms spending higher 
levels of internal R&D receive in average more subsidies, 
however it cannot be inferred from it, that this higher level 
of R&D expenditures are an effect of R&D subsidies.  In fact, 
results in table 4 indicate that R&D subsidies’ coefficient is 
not statically significant.
Firms performing only external R&D exhibit a different 
performance. In this case, lower levels of R&D expenditure 
correspond to subsidized firms. For higher levels of R&D ex-
penditures, there are a few differences between subsidized 
and non-subsidized firms. Estimation from table 4 reports 
In order to account for previous experience and invest-
ments in R&D, lagged effort is included. It is positive for firms 
performing any innovation strategy and shows that firms 
with previous experience in these types of activities, both 
at internal or external level, devote more resources to R&D.
Financial restriction is considered as inclusive of firm’s own 
fund proportion with respect to total liabilities. This variable 
is positive and statistically significant for firms performing 
pure innovation strategies. It is consistent with information 
in statistical descriptions which show that on average, firms 
with only internal or external R&D are smaller and have 
lesser availability of resources.
Variable related with diversification of product is significant 
only in the case of mixed strategy. This variable has the value 
of 1 for firms not diversified and 0 otherwise. A more diver-
sified line of business implies that firms have more difficul-
ties investing in specific technology and assets. Positive sign 
of this variable could be interpreted as follows:  firms with 
more specifics process and assets invest a bigger proportion 
of their total R&D expenditure in internal R&D activities.  
Variable capturing the impact of R&D subsidies report posi-
tive influence of public funds for firms performing external 
and mixed R&D activities, and negative sign for firms car-
rying out only internal activities. In order to analyze these 
effect in deep, treatment effect is shown in the next section.
Subsidy Impact on R&D Expenditure
Once endogeneity bias is controlled; it is possible to cal-
culate predicted R&D expenditures for firms with different 
innovations’ strategy depending on its exposition to the 
subsidy. The differences in expected R&D expenditures be-
tween subsidized and non subsidized are estimated using the 
following equation (3):
Figure 1a,b,c. Expected R&D expenditures in subsidized and not  
subsidized firms
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